

The Renaissance

35-59 81st Street, Jackson Heights, NY 11372

www.renaissancecharter.org • 718-803-0060 • 718-803-3785 (fax)

Charter School

BOARD OF TRUSTEES

Monte Joffe, Ed.D.

Chairperson

Everett Boyd

Secretary

Stacey Gauthier

Chester Hicks

Raymond Johnson

Rachel Mandel

Margaret Martinez-DeLuca

Conor McCoy

Francine Smith

AGENDA

February 6, 2019 – 6:45 PM

Public Meeting of The Board of Trustees

HONORARY MEMBERS

Hazel DuBois, Ph.D. 1937-2013

Hon. Rudolph Greco, Esq.

Meryl Thompson

- | | |
|--|------------|
| 1) Chairperson's Welcome and Message | 3 minutes |
| 2) Pledge of Allegiance | 1 minute |
| 3) Roll Call | 1 minute |
| 4) Charter Renewal Update - ELL Initiative Committee and ELL Admissions Preference, Timeline, Board Meetings | 15 minutes |
| 5) Approval of December 5, 2018 minutes | 5 minute |
| 6) Mid-Year Development Report | 10 minutes |
| 7) Mid-Year Financial Report | 10 minutes |
| 8) Mid-Year Academic Report | 15 minutes |
| 9) Discussion and Vote on Revised School Policy Handbook | 15 minutes |
| 10) Board Members New Business | 5 minutes |
| 11) Public Speaking | TBD |

Public speaking time of three minutes per person will be permitted. All speakers should sign-up with the Secretary prior to the meeting and state the topic they will be speaking on. Speakers may be grouped according to topic.

12) Adjournment of Public Session

13) Executive Session

“Developing Leaders for the Renaissance of New York”

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Sandra Geyer

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Dr. Rachel Mandel

Margaret Martinez-DeLuca

Conor McCoy

Francine Smith

-DRAFT-

December 5, 2018

The Renaissance Charter School

Meeting of the Board of Trustees

HONORARY MEMBERS

Hazel DuBois, Ph.D. 1937-2013

Hon. Rudolph Greco, Esq.

Meryl Thompson

The meeting convened at 6:55 PM.

1. Chairperson's Welcome - Dr. Joffe thanked everyone for their dedication to the mission of the school and for their hard work in preparation for our charter renewal visit by the NYC DOE authorizing team. He also conveyed his assurance that the ongoing hard work was evident throughout the school, especially in the testimonials that each speaker delivered at the renewal public hearing. Dr. Joffe said that our founders are very proud.
2. A moment of silence was held in honor of the life of the late Senator Jose Peralta, parent, friend, and political advocate of The Renaissance Charter School, who passed away recently.
3. Pledge of Allegiance
4. Roll Call – Attendance taken by Everett Boyd, Secretary.
Present: Everett Boyd, Stacey Gauthier, Chester Hicks, Monte Joffe, Raymond Johnson, Rachel Mandel, Margaret Martinez-DeLuca, Conor McCoy, and Francine Smith.
Absent: Sandy Geyer (on medical leave)
Also Present: Joseph Albano, CPA, Matthew DeForte, attorney, and Denise Hur, Director of Operations
5. Review and Approval of Certified Financial Reports - Joseph Albano, CPA, delivered the report, guided the board and meeting attendees through the highlights, paying specific attention to the school's current financial position as it relates to funding from the state and city that has been anticipated since earlier this year, and was recently received. Mr. Albano pointed out that the school has been placed at an extreme financial disadvantage due to the funding lag, depleting its reserves in order to maintain high quality programming and the curriculum delivery, which accounts for more than 90% of the school's budget.

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The school is still awaiting additional funding that has been allocated and has devised a plan to replenish its reserve account over the next few years, with the promise of increased funding and the hope that school's request will be granted to increase enrollment through the revision of its charter.

A motion was made and seconded to approve the financial report. The motion passed by unanimous vote.

6. Report on Executive Compensation – Stacey Gauthier, principal, delivered the following report:

Each year, we report to the Board, the compensation of members of the School Management Team of the School. As a unionized charter school, all of our management team members are part of the Council of Supervisors and Administrators (CSA). In the contract negotiated between the Board and CSA, our compensations is based on the DOE salary schedule for Principals, Assistant Principals and Educational Administrators which in addition to position takes into account years of service in determining an annual rate of pay. Additionally, members of the SMT are eligible for performance bonuses based on the contractually negotiated process for earning these which is measured on charter goal achievement.

Progress Toward Goals –

Renaissance met 18 out of 21 goals. The goals that were not met were –

- Grade 3-8 NYS ELA Assessments – There was a substantial improvement in ELA performance overall. Last year, we outperformed the city in all grades and outperformed CSD 30 in grades 4 and 6. In grade 7, we were one point below the district.
- High School Math Regents Scoring above a 75% - While we consistently meet the goal for passing the regents with a 65%, we are still working on increasing the pass rate score.
- Balanced Budget Goal

We will continue to focus on ELA in the elementary and middle school. I have shared many documents regarding our instructional goals, professional development priorities and curriculum with the Educational Support Committee Chair and Vice Chair as part of the renewal process and this will continue to be a focus of our work moving forward.

7. Approval of October 3, 2018 minutes – The minutes were read, with one revision noted.

A motion was made and seconded to approve the minutes, as revised. The motion passed by unanimous vote.

8. Approval of Chronic Absenteeism Policy – Ms. Gauthier read the policy, which was included in the board meeting packet. Dr. Joffee asked a question regarding the safety triggers that the school has in place to monitor student attendance when it becomes a critical issue and how the school handles the chronic attendance. Ms. Gauthier outlined a process which involves a number of key staff members who become actively involved in addressing critical issues of student attendance, including teachers, counselors, social workers, and school administrators, who contact students and families to assess the issues that may be contributing to the absenteeism of the child. In some circumstances, outside agencies become involved, at the directive of school personnel, with the goal of providing the supports that are needed to help the child and to improve attendance.

A motion was made and seconded to approve the policy. The motion passed by unanimous vote.

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9. School Management Team Report - Annual Report: Progress Towards Goals, Accountability Metrics – Ms. Gauthier delivered the report and stated that most of the accountability metrics have been met, referring to the report entitled, “ Entry 3 Progress toward Goals”, which was included in the board meeting packet.

a) Charter Renewal Update - Ms. Gauthier gave a briefing about the charter renewal visit, highlighting many of positive aspects that the authorizing team commented on, including solid lessons that displayed good teaching and rigorous student learning and engagement. The authorizers also made very positive observations about the culture of the school and the environment that is conducive to experiential learning and higher academic achievement.

10. Discussion and Vote on Revising the Charter to include a preference for English Language Learners - Ms. Gauthier said that the authorizers acknowledge that the school’s Special Education enrollment is significantly higher than Community School District (CSD) 30, and that we are achieving success with this population of students. However, the school is significantly under-enrolled with English Language Learners (ELL), compared to CSD 30. This is a point that has been previously raised by the DOE. Reliable comparative data has been difficult to find. The school acknowledges the need to increase its ELL population and is exploring an enrollment preference for ELL students as a charter revision. The details of an enrollment preference need to be worked out. Among the details that need to be worked out are grade-level entry points for ELL students, the capacity of the school to service incoming ELL students, the district

The board decided to create a committee to work on the details of a proposal to request an ELL enrollment preference in our next charter. The committee would be called The ELL Initiative Committee. A motion was made and seconded to create the committee. The motion passed by unanimous vote. A resolution was made to constitute the committee with the following board members: Everett Boyd, Chair; Raymond Johnson, Margaret Martinez-DeLuca, and Monte Joffee.

11. Board Committee Reports – Dr. Joffee reported on the activity of Education Support Committee and the 2018-2019 Principal/School Leadership Team Evaluation, which include a timetable for the remainder of the school year for the Principal/SMT review. The outline of the report was included in the board meeting packet.

12. Board Members’ New Business – Ms. Gauthier reported on the exciting and enriching activities for the 2018 Rensizzle Week, December 14-20.

13. Public Speaking – None

14. Adjournment of Public Session – 8:05 p.m.

15. Executive Session – 8:15 p.m.

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Development Report to the Board of Trustees February 6, 2019

2018-2019 Grant Update

(See attached sheet for more information.)

• **Direct Appeals**

These include checks and online donations received in response to Summer, Angel Fund, Garden Appeals – all direct donations to the school.

- Angel Fund – The angel fund as of January 30, 2019 has a balance of \$4,946. This school year we have helped one HS student enroll in a Saturday workshop series at FIT.

We will undoubtedly be fielding upcoming requests for

- the Middle School trip (unless cancelled)
- Nature's Classroom (unless cancelled)
- Senior dues
- Senior trip

Donations in any amount are always welcome.

- Giving Tuesday's Technology Campaign was started to raise funds to purchase additional chromebooks desperately needed by all the grades. Staff laptops and desktop computers, media center desktop computers and printers, and classroom smart boards are all at the end of their useful lifetimes, and will need to be replaced as funds are available. To date we have raised \$6,413, (including \$4,000 from Phil and Carol Gersmehl.) In addition we received an unrestricted grant from the Bydale Foundation that we would like to apply to the Technology fund, in the amount of \$5,000; bringing the total to \$9,413.

• **Pending grant applications:**

- Strebor Family Foundation – We have applied for support for the Spring Drama production ("*The Explorer's Club*"); last year we received \$1,700 and I am hopeful we will receive at least as much again, and should hear later in February.
- NYC Discretionary Funding – We were not successful in applying for Capital funding through the city council last year—again submitting the audio/visual upgrade for the auditorium, and more computer funding. We received conflicting information and it ended up in the same black-hole as before. However, we are assured by Danny Dromm's office and Francisco Moya's office that if we work through them this year, we will get something submitted.
 - We are in the contract-registration phase for FY19 Discretionary member-item funding for TREA in the amount of \$7,500 (\$5,000 from Dromm and \$2,500 from Moya), and will most likely get approved for that amount for FY20.

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- Peggy is working on the following applications:
 - Honda American, which we will submit after we find out if Reso A comes through, for more technology infrastructure;
 - Dreyfuss Foundation, for college and career leadership programs; and
 - Dollar Tree, for literacy support.
- **Update on Current Granted Programs:**
 - Advocacy for Conversion Charter School Contract Relief – After several years of untiring advocacy by Stacey, Ron Tabano, John York and our lobbyists, we have finally received 2 NYC DOE payments and the promised NYS legislative payment toward contract relief.
 - Federal E-Rate for FY 2019 – We have submitted our paperwork for Internet reimbursement for our current provider Transbeam/GTT, and will attempt to recoup some “Category 2” funds for our ongoing maintenance contract with IKON. We are still waiting for funds from FY2017 and FY2018, so we live in hope.
 - NYSED 2016-2019 Dissemination Grant to disseminate best practices around our College and Career Readiness program. We are partnered with the CSA professional development organization, ELI, who is providing professional development support in Growth Mindset practices, and the SPED Collaborative. Goals for this final year will focus almost entirely on the College and Career Office, college readiness
 - DYCD Compass Explore – We have been offered a contract extension for our Summer Permaculture program –\$42,106. We have completed three very successful summer programs for 3rd-5th graders. DYCD audited the financial and operational side of the program in November, and we received an ‘excellent’ or ‘exemplary’ rating in all categories.

In-Kind Grants and Donations

- DYCD SONYC grant received by 82SA for our middle-schooler after-school program, continues this year. The program has been aided considerably by the addition of Dan Fanelli as the Education Liaison, providing curricular ties to the after-school STEM activities, training 82SA teachers to lead the activities and following-up with teachers for additional curriculum ties and up-to-date homework assignments.
- CASA (NYC Council) after-school enrichment grant will go toward a media arts class for our 5th graders with Children’s Museum of the Arts.
- Urban Advantage (STEM Education) and Bubble Foundation (Nutrition Education) have all continued in some form. Bubble does not provide direct service to students at this stage, but will provide PD, some parent demonstrations, in the case of Bubble, and supplies/trips for the school and families.

Partnerships

Due to our budget problems, the outside partnerships that we have to pay have been scaled back. One of our biggest disappointments was the loss of our PK-2 Art & Yoga program, having only raised \$2,464. This will be applied to an early-grade arts residency.

Renaissance continues to nurture outside community partnerships as a way to expand our influence beyond the school walls. Our long-time partner Bubble Foundation, along with several other food & nutrition grants to promote healthy eating for families, have supported cooking

“Developing Leaders for the Renaissance of New York”

demonstrations for families on Saturdays, garden and kitchen supplies, and ‘Teen Battle Chef’ cooking & nutrition for teens. We are renewing a partnership with the Carnegie Foundation, called “Link UP: The Orchestra Sings” with new music teacher Katie Schmelzer and the 5th grade. CMA is back with media arts for Leah’s 2nd grade, our after-school, and will also bring this to our 9th grade humanities program.

The Leadership Program’s opportunities for community involvement and skill-building for our students, still sports an extensive list of community partners on their blog: (<https://leadershiptrcs.wordpress.com/find-a-program/>). For purposes of this report, I will only list the in-school residencies that are part of the Leadership Program on Wednesday morning that the school pays for.

Leadership Program Partners

- Engineering for Kids – 2 programming classes
- Global Kids – 2 leadership classes
- Sadie Nash Young Women’s Leadership Project
- LAB Project: Learning About Business
- Beyond Organic Design – Permaculture Design
- Tech Crew
- Stage Jazz Band

Friends of Renaissance

Our goals for the FOR board are focused entirely on building our membership, by reaching out to our alumni base, and fundraising for Renaissance initiatives. Please consider supporting the Friends of Renaissance initiatives and events, as brought to you throughout the year by our liaison, FOR Board Chair, Conor McCoy. We will be making grants to the school from the money we have in our bank account (see below) at our next meeting.

Other

Renaissance’s political advocacy efforts continue to be the most successful way of bringing money to the school. We will continue to work with the NYC Charter Center and Coalition for Independent Charter Schools (C3S) in the continuing fight to get our funding formula restored. C3S schools agreed to hire Patrick Jenkins & Associates to more directly advocate for the special needs of independent charters, as well as our continuing work for conversion charter school relief.

Respectfully submitted,

Rebekah Oakes, Director of Development and Partnerships

THE RENAISSANCE CHARTER SCHOOL

Grants Awarded 2018-2019

Direct Appeals:

Direct Funding Appeals – Unrestricted & Technology	\$10,988	
FOR Grant from other Direct Appeals		
Friends of Renaissance, Apple Bank Account	9,579	As of 12/31/2018
Angel Fund (SAF) from 2017-2018	3,816	
Angel Fund collected 2018-2019	1,130	
PK-2 Art Fund collected for 2018-19	2,464	
DIRECT TOTAL	\$27,977	

Government/Corporate/Foundation Grants:

Conversion CS Advocacy – Contract Expenses	204,125	FY19 NYS Conversion CS Contract Relief
Conversion CS Advocacy – Contract Expenses	349,613	FY19 NYC Conversion CS Contract Relief
Conversion CS Advocacy – Contract Expenses	722,385	FY18 NYC Conversion CS Contract Relief
NYS Charter School Dissemination, 3 yrs: \$500K	176,782	College Bound
DYCD COMPASS Grant	42,106	Permaculture Program Summer-Summer18
DYCD NYC City Council Discretionary, Dromm/Moya	7,500	TREA
NYC Kids Rise	500	administrative costs
US E-Rate Internet Reimbursement:	29,419	FY17 Cable Internet reimbursement
Strebtor Foundation		spring drama production
USDA 2018 Farm to School Planning Grant	50,000	Create plan for fresh food access
Grow to Learn - Grow NYC	2,000	Garden improvements
Budding Botanist	2,500	Garden Improvements
Bydale Foundation	5,000	Technology
GRANT TOTAL	\$1,591,930	
TOTAL	\$1,619,907	

In-Kind Services Received 2017-2018
TASC/Discretionary - 82SA CBO After School
OST DYCD - 82SA 6th-8th grade program
CASA After-School Programming (Dromm)
Urban Advantage
FEAST (Nutrition & Cooking Classes for Families)
Teen Battle Chef

Valued At
60,000
273,000
20,000
1,500
1,800

funding for 5th, 9th and 10th
middle school after-school program
CMA for after-school
STEM services, trips, supplies (\$450)
PD and Materials Support
Teen Battle Chef

EXPENSES YTD AS COMPARED TO WORKING BUDGET

Expenses as of 12/31/18

Payroll and Taxes (@10%)	Includes Per Session/Stipends/Retro/Prek/School Food	\$7,154,297	3,390,271.17	0.47
Pensions – TRS +Supplemental Contributions, BERS		\$1,622,711	572,039.12	0.35
Health Benefits		\$1,027,183	355,472.88	0.35
Contractual Retro Costs - included in payroll number above		\$576,245		0.00
Health and Welfare		\$145,528	63,947.94	0.44
CSA Compensation Accrual Fund		\$6,372		0.00
DC 37 Health & Security and Education Fund		\$3,424	2,027.64	0.59
Audit Fees		\$25,000		0.00
Legal Fees		\$50,000	20,835.00	0.42
ADP Payroll & Other Payroll Expenses		\$25,000	11,064.14	0.44
Consultants		\$50,000	66,338.75	1.33
Administrative Expenses/Office Expenses/Technology Supplies/Marketing		\$42,000	30,282.94	0.72
Postage, Delivery and Freight		\$15,000	2,422.88	0.16
Meetings/Meals/Travel		\$10,000	3,863.74	0.39
Leased Equipment: Copiers/Laminators		\$30,000	21,550.76	0.72
Internet Service		\$15,000	300.00	0.02
Insurance		\$100,000	65,900.00	0.66
Capital Expenditures (Fixed Assets on Balance Sheet)		\$40,000		0.00
Substitutes		\$100,000	35,056.64	0.35
Teaching & Learning		\$250,000	154,023.90	0.62
PreK (salaries/benefits included above)		\$250,000	4,406.84	0.02
School Food	(salaries/benefits included above)	\$517,127	128,781.50	0.25
Grant Expenses			39,782.90	
Facilities			2,776.99	
<u>TOTAL PROJECTED EXPENSES</u>		\$12,054,887	\$4,965,478.62	
			0.41	

NOTES:

Per Session includes the following: B/AS, PLCs, Coverages, PD, Mentoring, Stipends, General Consultants include the following: Teaching Artists, CSBM, JPS Solutions, PBI, IKON July and August expenses are charged to previous years budget



Financial Report Template

for NYC DoE Authorized Charter Schools

Charter School Name:	The Renaissance Charter School
DBN:	84Q705
Report Submission Date:	2/1/2019
School Fiscal Contact Name:	Denise Hur
School Fiscal Contact Email:	dhur@renaissancecharter.org
School Fiscal Contact Phone:	718-803-0060 ext.109

Please read these directions before submitting this document:

1. Please fill in the gray cells on ALL tabs.
2. Please fill in the required information per the Accountability Requirements Calendar for each quarter.
3. Please see tab-specific directions below.

Green Financial Position Tab - each quarter has its own column in this worksheet (see headers in rows 6 and 7). Please fill in the column for that specific quarter.

Yellow Statement of Activities Tabs - each quarter has its own tab. Please fill in the tab for that specific quarter.

Purple Cash Flow Tab - each quarter has its own column in this tab (see headers in rows 6 and 7). Please fill in the column for that specific quarter.

Peach Functional Expenses Tabs - each quarter has its own tab. Please fill in the tab for that specific quarter.

4. You will resubmit this document every quarter, updated with the most recent quarter's financial information. You will use the same document for each school year; please save it in an easily accessible place.
5. If you have questions or issues with this document, please contact charteroversight@schools.nyc.gov

**The Renaissance Charter School
Statement of Financial Position**

	Quarter 1	Quarter 2	Quarter 3	Quarter 4
	July 1 - September 30 2018	October 1 - December 31 2018	January 1 - March 31 2019	April 1- June 30 2019
<u>CURRENT ASSETS</u>				
Cash and cash equivalents	\$ 696,094	\$ 1,823,187	\$ -	\$ -
Grants and contracts receivable	908,474	104,299	-	-
Accounts receivables	-	-	-	-
Prepaid Expenses	2,755	5,029	-	-
Contributions and other receivables	-	-	-	-
Other current assets	54,898	83,265	-	-
TOTAL CURRENT ASSETS	1,662,221	2,015,780	-	-
<u>NON-CURRENT ASSETS</u>				
Property, Building and Equipment, net	\$ 190,331	\$ 190,331	\$ -	\$ -
Restricted Cash	70,373	70,551	-	-
Security Deposits	-	-	-	-
Other Non-Current Assets	-	-	-	-
TOTAL NON-CURRENT ASSETS	260,704	260,881	-	-
TOTAL ASSETS	1,922,925	2,276,662	-	-
<u>CURRENT LIABILITIES</u>				
Accounts payable and accrued expenses	\$ 111,380	\$ 94,477	\$ -	\$ -
Accrued payroll, payroll taxes and benefits	621,794	621,794	-	-
Current Portion of Loan Payable	-	-	-	-
Due to Related Parties	-	-	-	-
Refundable Advances	-	-	-	-
Deferred Revenue	899,811	1,639,437	-	-
Other Current Liabilities	-	-	-	-
TOTAL CURRENT LIABILITIES	1,632,985	2,355,708	-	-
<u>LONG-TERM LIABILITIES</u>				
Loan Payable; Due in More than One Year	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -
Deferred Rent	-	-	-	-
Due to Related Party	-	-	-	-
Other Long-Term Liabilities	1,600,000	1,600,000	-	-
TOTAL LONG-TERM LIABILITIES	1,600,000	1,600,000	-	-
TOTAL LIABILITIES	3,232,985	3,955,709	-	-
<u>NET ASSETS</u>				
Unrestricted	\$ (1,310,060)	\$ (1,679,047)	\$ (1,679,047)	\$ (1,679,047)
Temporarily restricted	-	-	-	-
Permanently restricted	-	-	-	-
TOTAL NET ASSETS	(1,310,060)	(1,679,047)	(1,679,047)	(1,679,047)
TOTAL LIABILITIES AND NET ASSETS	1,922,925	2,276,661	(1,679,047)	(1,679,047)

**The Renaissance Charter School
Statement of Activities**

	Quarter 1			Quarter 1	
	July 1 - September 30 2018 Actuals			July 1 - September 30 2018 Budget	
	Unrestricted	Temporarily Restricted	Total	Total	
OPERATING REVENUE					
State and Local Per Pupil Revenue - Reg. Ed	\$ 2,112,561	\$ -	\$ 2,112,561	\$	2,135,466
State and Local Per Pupil Revenue - SPED	287,032	-	287,032		352,405
State and Local Per Pupil Facilities Revenue	-	-	-		-
Federal Grants	45,186	-	45,186		31,047
State and City Grants	-	-	-		398,543
Other Operating Income	-	-	-		-
Food Service/Child Nutrition Program	19,384	-	19,384		37,100
TOTAL OPERATING REVENUE	2,464,163	-	2,464,163		2,954,560
EXPENSES					
Program Services					
Regular Education	\$ 927,426	\$ -	\$ 927,426	\$	1,358,308
Special Education	191,601	-	191,601		260,413
Other Programs	108,183	-	108,183		112,289
Total Program Services	1,227,210	-	1,227,210		1,731,011
Management and general	190,037	-	190,037		168,601
Fundraising	-	-	-		17,713
TOTAL EXPENSES	1,417,247	-	1,417,247		1,917,324
SURPLUS / (DEFICIT) FROM OPERATIONS	1,046,916	-	1,046,916		1,037,236
SUPPORT AND OTHER REVENUE					
Interest and Other Income	\$ 1,151	\$ -	\$ 1,151	\$	750
Contributions and Grants	13,030	-	13,030		3,750
Fundraising Support	-	-	-		-
Investments	-	-	-		-
Donated Services	-	-	-		-
Other Support and Revenue	-	-	-		900
TOTAL SUPPORT AND OTHER REVENUE	14,181	-	14,181		5,400
Net Assets Released from Restrictions / Loss on Disposal of Assets	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$	-
CHANGE IN NET ASSETS	1,061,097	-	1,061,097		1,042,636
NET ASSETS - BEGINNING OF YEAR	\$ (2,371,157)	\$ -	\$ (2,371,157)	\$	(2,371,157)
PRIOR YEAR/PERIOD ADJUSTMENTS	-	-	-		-
NET ASSETS - END OF YEAR	\$ (1,310,060)	\$ -	\$ (1,310,060)	\$	(1,328,521)

**The Renaissance Charter School
Statement of Activities**

	Quarter 2			Quarter 2	
	October 1 - December 31 2018 Actuals			October 1- December 31 2018 Budget	
	Unrestricted	Temporarily Restricted	Total	Total	
OPERATING REVENUE					
State and Local Per Pupil Revenue - Reg. Ed	\$ 2,150,423	\$ -	\$ 2,150,423	\$	2,135,466
State and Local Per Pupil Revenue - SPED	273,086	-	273,086		352,405
State and Local Per Pupil Facilities Revenue	-	-	-		-
Federal Grants	164,770	-	164,770		154,757
State and City Grants	468,431	-	468,431		437,243
Other Operating Income	-	-	-		-
Food Service/Child Nutrition Program	103,027	-	103,027		111,300
TOTAL OPERATING REVENUE	3,159,738	-	3,159,738		3,191,170
EXPENSES					
Program Services					
Regular Education	\$ 2,542,369	\$ -	\$ 2,542,369	\$	2,216,632
Special Education	461,368	-	461,368		424,970
Other Programs	221,477	-	221,477		183,246
Total Program Services	3,225,214	-	3,225,214		2,824,847
Management and general	306,380	-	306,380		275,141
Fundraising	-	-	-		28,906
TOTAL EXPENSES	3,531,593	-	3,531,593		3,128,894
SURPLUS / (DEFICIT) FROM OPERATIONS	(371,856)	-	(371,856)		62,276
SUPPORT AND OTHER REVENUE					
Interest and Other Income	\$ 369	\$ -	\$ 369	\$	750
Contributions and Grants	2,500	-	2,500		3,750
Fundraising Support	-	-	-		-
Investments	-	-	-		-
Donated Services	-	-	-		-
Other Support and Revenue	-	-	-		2,700
TOTAL SUPPORT AND OTHER REVENUE	2,869	-	2,869		7,200
Net Assets Released from Restrictions / Loss on Disposal of Assets	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$	-
CHANGE IN NET ASSETS	(368,987)	-	(368,987)		69,476
NET ASSETS - BEGINNING OF YEAR	\$ (1,310,060)	\$ -	\$ (1,310,060)	\$	(1,328,521)
PRIOR YEAR/PERIOD ADJUSTMENTS	-	-	-		-
NET ASSETS - END OF YEAR	\$ (1,679,047)	\$ -	\$ (1,679,047)	\$	(1,259,045)

**The Renaissance Charter School
Statement of Activities**

	Quarter 3			Quarter 3	
	January 1- March 31 2019 Actuals			January 1 - March 31 2019 Budget	
	Unrestricted	Temporarily Restricted	Total	Total	
OPERATING REVENUE					
State and Local Per Pupil Revenue - Reg. Ed	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	2,135,466
State and Local Per Pupil Revenue - SPED	-	-	-	-	352,405
State and Local Per Pupil Facilities Revenue	-	-	-	-	-
Federal Grants	-	-	-	-	76,792
State and City Grants	-	-	-	-	437,243
Other Operating Income	-	-	-	-	-
Food Service/Child Nutrition Program	-	-	-	-	111,300
TOTAL OPERATING REVENUE	-	-	-	-	3,113,205
EXPENSES					
Program Services					
Regular Education	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	2,216,632
Special Education	-	-	-	-	424,970
Other Programs	-	-	-	-	183,246
Total Program Services	-	-	-	-	2,824,847
Management and general	-	-	-	-	275,141
Fundraising	-	-	-	-	28,906
TOTAL EXPENSES	-	-	-	-	3,128,894
SURPLUS / (DEFICIT) FROM OPERATIONS	-	-	-	-	(15,689)
SUPPORT AND OTHER REVENUE					
Interest and Other Income	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	750
Contributions and Grants	-	-	-	-	3,750
Fundraising Support	-	-	-	-	-
Investments	-	-	-	-	-
Donated Services	-	-	-	-	-
Other Support and Revenue	-	-	-	-	2,700
TOTAL SUPPORT AND OTHER REVENUE	-	-	-	-	7,200
Net Assets Released from Restrictions / Loss on Disposal of Assets	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	-
CHANGE IN NET ASSETS	-	-	-	-	(8,489)
NET ASSETS - BEGINNING OF YEAR	\$ (1,679,047)	\$ -	\$ (1,679,047)	\$ -	(1,259,045)
PRIOR YEAR/PERIOD ADJUSTMENTS	-	-	-	-	-
NET ASSETS - END OF YEAR	\$ (1,679,047)	\$ -	\$ (1,679,047)	\$ -	(1,267,535)

**The Renaissance Charter School
Statement of Activities**

	Quarter 4			Quarter 4	
	April 1 - June 30 2019 Actuals			April 1 - June 30 2019 Budget	
	Unrestricted	Temporarily Restricted	Total	Total	
OPERATING REVENUE					
State and Local Per Pupil Revenue - Reg. Ed	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$	2,135,466
State and Local Per Pupil Revenue - SPED	-	-	-		352,405
State and Local Per Pupil Facilities Revenue	-	-	-		-
Federal Grants	-	-	-		76,792
State and City Grants	-	-	-		469,803
Other Operating Income	-	-	-		-
Food Service/Child Nutrition Program	-	-	-		111,300
TOTAL OPERATING REVENUE	-	-	-		3,145,765
EXPENSES					
Program Services					
Regular Education	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$	3,015,500
Special Education	-	-	-		578,128
Other Programs	-	-	-		249,287
Total Program Services	-	-	-		3,842,914
Management and general	-	-	-		374,301
Fundraising	-	-	-		39,323
TOTAL EXPENSES	-	-	-		4,256,538
SURPLUS / (DEFICIT) FROM OPERATIONS	-	-	-		(1,110,774)
SUPPORT AND OTHER REVENUE					
Interest and Other Income	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$	750
Contributions and Grants	-	-	-		3,750
Fundraising Support	-	-	-		-
Investments	-	-	-		-
Donated Services	-	-	-		-
Other Support and Revenue	-	-	-		2,700
TOTAL SUPPORT AND OTHER REVENUE	-	-	-		7,200
Net Assets Released from Restrictions / Loss on Disposal of Assets	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$	-
CHANGE IN NET ASSETS	-	-	-		(1,103,574)
NET ASSETS - BEGINNING OF YEAR	\$ (1,679,047)	\$ -	\$ (1,679,047)	\$	(1,267,535)
PRIOR YEAR/PERIOD ADJUSTMENTS	-	-	-		-
NET ASSETS - END OF YEAR	\$ (1,679,047)	\$ -	\$ (1,679,047)	\$	(2,371,108)

**The Renaissance Charter School
Statement of Cash Flows**

	Quarter 1	Quarter 2	Quarter 3	Quarter 4
	July 1 - September 30 2018	October 1 - December 31 2018	January 1 - March 31 2019	April 1- June 30 2019
CASH FLOWS - OPERATING ACTIVITIES				
Increase (decrease) in net assets	\$ 1,061,097	\$ (368,987)	\$ -	\$ -
Revenues from School Districts	-	-	-	-
Accounts Receivable	-	-	-	-
Due from School Districts	-	-	-	-
Depreciation	-	-	-	-
Grants Receivable	201,732	804,175	-	-
Due from NYS	-	-	-	-
Grant revenues	-	-	-	-
Prepaid Expenses	(2,755)	(2,274)	-	-
Accounts Payable	(170,096)	4,347	-	-
Accrued Expenses	(430,575)	(21,250)	-	-
Accrued Liabilities	(1,080,764)	-	-	-
Contributions and fund-raising activities	-	-	-	-
Miscellaneous sources	-	-	-	-
Deferred Revenue	899,811	739,626	-	-
Interest payments	-	-	-	-
Other	146	-	-	-
Due from TRCS II	(5,736)	(28,368)	-	-
NET CASH PROVIDED FROM OPERATING ACTIVITIES	\$ 472,860	\$ 1,127,270	\$ -	\$ -
CASH FLOWS - INVESTING ACTIVITIES				
Purchase of equipment	-	-	-	-
Other	-	-	-	-
NET CASH PROVIDED FROM INVESTING ACTIVITIES	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -
CASH FLOWS - FINANCING ACTIVITIES				
Principal payments on long-term debt	-	-	-	-
Other	-	-	-	-
NET CASH PROVIDED FROM FINANCING ACTIVITIES	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -
NET (DECREASE) INCREASE IN CASH AND CASH EQUIVALENTS	\$ 472,860	\$ 1,127,270	\$ -	\$ -
Cash at beginning of year	293,607	766,467	-	-
CASH AND CASH EQUIVALENTS AT END OF YEAR	\$ 766,467	\$ 1,893,737	\$ -	\$ -

**The Renaissance Charter School
Statement of Functional Expenses**

**Quarter 1
July 1 - September 30 2018 Actuals**

**Quarter 1
July 1 -
September 30
2018 Budget**

No. of Positions	Program Services				Supporting Services			Total	Total	
	Regular	Special	Other Education	Total	Fundraising	Management and	Total			
	Education	Education				General				
Personnel Services Costs	\$	\$	\$	\$	\$	\$	\$	\$	\$	
Administrative Staff Personnel	9.00	217,257	41,171	3,446	261,873	-	82,697	82,697	344,570	422,417
Instructional Personnel	81.00	369,110	69,948	12,069	451,127	-	21,629	21,629	472,756	598,857
Non-Instructional Personnel	5.50	-	-	25,719	25,719	-	-	-	25,719	-
Total Salaries and Staff	95.50	586,367	111,119	41,234	738,720	-	104,326	104,326	843,046	1,021,274
Fringe Benefits & Payroll Taxes		124,891	23,667	8,782	157,340	-	22,220	22,220	179,561	386,577
Retirement		91,335	17,308	6,423	115,067	-	16,250	16,250	131,317	175,607
Management Company Fees		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Legal Service		-	-	-	-	-	12,501	12,501	12,501	12,500
Accounting / Audit Services		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Other Purchased / Professional / Consulting Services		4,757	902	13,446	19,105	-	22,080	22,080	41,185	46,250
Building and Land Rent / Lease		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Repairs & Maintenance		570	108	764	1,443	-	101	101	1,544	-
Insurance		45,836	8,686	3,223	57,745	-	8,155	8,155	65,900	87,000
Utilities		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Supplies / Materials		55,273	26,325	1,432	83,030	-	-	-	83,030	68,238
Equipment / Furnishings		-	-	2,541	2,541	-	-	-	2,541	12,500
Staff Development		2,507	475	176	3,158	-	446	446	3,604	7,500
Marketing / Recruitment		399	76	-	475	-	-	-	475	125
Technology		9,627	1,824	677	12,128	-	1,713	1,713	13,841	12,775
Food Service		-	-	29,071	29,071	-	-	-	29,071	57,713
Student Services		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Office Expense		5,863	1,111	412	7,387	-	2,245	2,245	9,631	13,750
Depreciation		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	15,516
OTHER		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total Expenses		\$ 927,426	\$ 191,601	\$ 108,183	\$ 1,227,210	\$ -	\$ 190,037	\$ 190,037	\$ 1,417,247	\$ 1,917,324

**The Renaissance Charter School
Statement of Functional Expenses**

		Quarter 2 October 1 - December 31 2018 Actuals							Quarter 2 October 1 - December 31 2018 Budget		
No. of Positions		Program Services				Supporting Services			Total	Total	
		Regular	Special	Other Education	Total	Fundraising	Management and	Total			
		Education	Education				General				
		\$	\$	\$	\$	\$	\$	\$	\$	\$	
	Personnel Services Costs										
	Administrative Staff Personnel	9.00	349,266	63,324	5,501	418,091	-	132,029	132,029	550,120	422,417
	Instructional Personnel	81.00	1,368,507	248,116	45,108	1,661,731	-	51,673	51,673	1,713,404	1,383,449
	Non-Instructional Personnel	5.50	-	-	45,907	45,907	-	-	-	45,907	-
	Total Salaries and Staff	95.50	1,717,773	311,440	96,516	2,125,729	-	183,702	183,702	2,309,431	1,805,866
	Fringe Benefits & Payroll Taxes		352,577	63,924	19,810	436,310	-	37,705	37,705	474,016	454,559
	Retirement		327,813	59,434	18,419	405,665	-	35,057	35,057	440,722	405,678
	Management Company Fees		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Legal Service		-	-	-	-	-	8,334	8,334	8,334	12,500
	Accounting / Audit Services		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Other Purchased / Professional / Consulting Services		30,605	5,549	8,769	44,923	-	36,817	36,817	81,740	43,750
	Building and Land Rent / Lease		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Repairs & Maintenance		2,413	437	860	3,710	-	258	258	3,968	-
	Insurance		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Utilities		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Supplies / Materials		77,183	14,419	2,975	94,576	-	-	-	94,576	131,238
	Equipment / Furnishings		277	50	211	538	-	30	30	568	12,500
	Staff Development		1,618	293	91	2,002	-	173	173	2,176	22,500
	Marketing / Recruitment		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	125
	Technology		20,106	3,645	1,130	24,881	-	2,150	2,150	27,031	37,775
	Food Service		-	-	72,023	72,023	-	-	-	72,023	173,138
	Student Services		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Office Expense		12,004	2,176	674	14,855	-	2,154	2,154	17,009	13,750
	Depreciation		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	15,516
	OTHER		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Total Expenses		\$ 2,542,369	\$ 461,368	\$ 221,477	\$ 3,225,214	\$ -	\$ 306,380	\$ 306,380	\$ 3,531,593	\$ 3,128,894

**The Renaissance Charter School
Statement of Functional Expenses**

		Quarter 3 January 1 - March 31 2019 Actuals							Quarter 3 January 1 - March 31 2019 Budget	
No. of Positions	Program Services				Supporting Services			Total	Total	
	Regular Education	Special Education	Other Education	Total	Fundraising	Management and General	Total			
Personnel Services Costs		\$	\$	\$	\$	\$	\$	\$	\$	
Administrative Staff Personnel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	422,417
Instructional Personnel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,383,449
Non-Instructional Personnel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total Salaries and Staff	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,805,866
Fringe Benefits & Payroll Taxes										454,559
Retirement										405,678
Management Company Fees										-
Legal Service										12,500
Accounting / Audit Services										-
Other Purchased / Professional / Consulting Services										43,750
Building and Land Rent / Lease										-
Repairs & Maintenance										-
Insurance										-
Utilities										-
Supplies / Materials										131,238
Equipment / Furnishings										12,500
Staff Development										22,500
Marketing / Recruitment										125
Technology										37,775
Food Service										173,138
Student Services										-
Office Expense										13,750
Depreciation										15,516
OTHER										-
Total Expenses		\$	\$	\$	\$	\$	\$	\$	\$	3,128,894

**The Renaissance Charter School
Statement of Functional Expenses**

		Quarter 4							Quarter 4
		April 1 - June 30 2019 Actuals							April 1 - June 30 2019 Budget
No. of Positions	Program Services				Supporting Services			Total	Total
	Regular Education	Special Education	Other Education	Total	Fundraising	Management and General	Total		
Personnel Services Costs		\$	\$	\$	\$	\$	\$	\$	\$
Administrative Staff Personnel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	422,417
Instructional Personnel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2,168,040
Non-Instructional Personnel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total Salaries and Staff	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2,590,457
Fringe Benefits & Payroll Taxes	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	522,541
Retirement	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	635,749
Management Company Fees	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Legal Service	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	12,500
Accounting / Audit Services	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	45,000
Other Purchased / Professional / Consulting Services	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	43,750
Building and Land Rent / Lease	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Repairs & Maintenance	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Insurance	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Utilities	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Supplies / Materials	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	131,238
Equipment / Furnishings	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	12,500
Staff Development	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	22,500
Marketing / Recruitment	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	125
Technology	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	37,775
Food Service	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	173,138
Student Services	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Office Expense	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	13,750
Depreciation	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	15,516
OTHER	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total Expenses	\$	-	\$	-	\$	-	\$	-	\$ 4,256,538

School: Renaissance Charter School
Subject: Mathematics
Assessment Window: A2 (2019)

Percentage Above/Below Network: School: 48% Network: 40% Percentage Above Network: +8%

Grade	K	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
School			71%	56%	58%	58%	58%	60%	33%
Network			54%	46%	43%	42%	37%	30%	29%

High Score Standards

Grade	K	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
			2.NBT.A.1	3.OA.A.7	4.NBT.A.1 (2)	5.OA.A.1 (1)	6.NS.C.6.c (2)	7.NS.A.2.d (1)	8.EE.A.5 (2)
			2.NBT.A.5	3.OA.A.3-(3)	4.MD.A.3-(2)	5.NBT.B.6-(4)	6.NS.C.6.b (2)	7.RP.A.2.d (1)	8.EE.B.5 (4)
			2.NBT.A.2	3.NBT.A.2	4.NBT.B.5-(4)	5.NBT.A.3.a (1)	6.NS.C.6.c (1)	7.EE.A.1 (3)	8.EE.A.4 (2)

Lowest Score Standards

Grade	K	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
			2.NBT.A.4	3.MD.A.1-(3)	4.OA.A.3-(2)	5.NBT.B.7 (4)	6.NS.B.4 (1)	7.NS.A.1.d-(1)	8.G.A.3 (3)
			2.NBT.B.6	3.OA.A.5-(2)	4.AO.A.1-(2)	5.NF.A.2-(2)	6.NS.A.1 (3)	7.NS.A.3 (4)	8.EE.C.7.a (2)
			2.OA.A.1	3.OA.A.4-(2)	4.MD.A.3 (1)	5.MD.A.1 (2)	6.NS.C.5 (1)	7.RP.A.1 (2)	8.EE.C.7 (1)

School: Renaissance Charter School
Subject: Mathematics
Assessment Window: A2 (2019)

Percentage Above/Below Network: School: 48% Network: 40% Percentage Above Network: +8%

Grade	K	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
School			71%	56%	58%	58%	58%	60%	33%
Network			54%	46%	43%	42%	37%	30%	29%

High Score Standards

Grade	K	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
			2.NBT.A.1	3.OA.A.7	4.NBT.A.1 (2)	5.OA.A.1 (1)	6.NS.C.6.c (2)	7.NS.A.2.d (1)	8.EE.A.5 (2)
			2.NBT.A.5	3.OA.A.3-(3)	4.MD.A.3-(2)	5.NBT.B.6-(4)	6.NS.C.6.b (2)	7.RP.A.2.d (1)	8.EE.B.5 (4)
			2.NBT.A.2	3.NBT.A.2	4.NBT.B.5-(4)	5.NBT.A.3.a (1)	6.NS.C.6.c (1)	7.EE.A.1 (3)	8.EE.A.4 (2)

Lowest Score Standards

Grade	K	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
			2.NBT.A.4	3.MD.A.1-(3)	4.OA.A.3-(2)	5.NBT.B.7 (4)	6.NS.B.4 (1)	7.NS.A.1.d-(1)	8.G.A.3 (3)
			2.NBT.B.6	3.OA.A.5-(2)	4.AO.A.1-(2)	5.NF.A.2-(2)	6.NS.A.1 (3)	7.NS.A.3 (4)	8.EE.C.7.a (2)
			2.OA.A.1	3.OA.A.4-(2)	4.MD.A.3 (1)	5.MD.A.1 (2)	6.NS.C.5 (1)	7.RP.A.1 (2)	8.EE.C.7 (1)

Progressive Education Meets the Market: Organizational Survival Among Independent Charter Schools

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January 2019

Since its inception in 1991, the charter school movement “has always been an ideologically big tent,” incorporating schools framed by both conservative market and progressive democratic tenets.ⁱ Publicly funded but privately operated, charter schools align with the market values of accountability, choice, efficiency, and privatization. At the same time, progressive reformers view charters as a vehicle for advancing progressive pedagogical and political goals: to educate students through experiential and inquiry-based approaches and to empower poor students and students of color historically underserved by the institution of public education.ⁱⁱ However, the charter school movement has become disproportionately aligned with market values, crowding out its progressive aims.ⁱⁱⁱ Scholars explain the rapid proliferation of market-oriented charter schools, such as those affiliated with charter management organizations (CMOs), by demonstrating the political and policymaking influence of free-market advocates.^{iv} These advocates advance a policy narrative arguing that the public sector is inherently inefficient and that public services will be improved through private management and competitive market effects. They frame charters as improving operational efficiency through private management, improving student achievement through accountability, and providing choice for families “trapped” in “failing” public schools.^v

In advancing the efficacy of market mechanisms, many charter school advocates neglect to account for how market forces perpetuate educational inequities. For example, many school choice and privatization initiatives have proliferated, particularly in urban areas, at the expense of equity-oriented policies intended to redistribute resources and ensure equal access.^{vi} When lacking explicit racial equity considerations, charters and other choice policies have contributed to levels of racial segregation that equal or surpass those prior to the 1954 *Brown v. Board of Education* decision that found state-sponsored school segregation to be unconstitutional.^{vii} Furthermore, competitive market dynamics often create and exacerbate already existing unequal choices for families and incentivize educators and advocates to prioritize profits and performance over student well-being.^{viii} Finally, the research on charter schools’ impact on student achievement is inconclusive, and such work often does not address how inequitable racial, social, and economic conditions shape students’ academic outcomes.^{ix}

Purpose of the Study

As market-oriented charter schools proliferate, it is easy to overlook charters founded on progressive pedagogical and political values, such as so-called homegrown, “mom-and-pop,” or independent charter schools. However, these schools warrant attention because they represent attempts by educators and communities to advance progressive, equitable, and democratic schooling in a market-oriented policy context that often inadequately addresses issues of equity. Thus, this qualitative, comparative case study examined how the leaders of three independent charter schools in New York City—Empire, Hudson, and Liberty Charter Schools—garnered political, financial, and ideological support for their founding progressive missions.^x I spent 10 months, from August 2017 to June 2018, conducting interviews and observations at each school

to understand how school leaders, board trustees, and their advocates engaged various constituencies to mobilize support for their progressive missions when disproportionate support flows to market-oriented charters such as CMOs. Further, I examined how, if at all, competitive market pressures impacted their efforts to sustain their schools. For additional details on this study's research design and participant recruitment procedures, please refer to the Appendix.

The Focal Charter Schools: Pedagogical and Political Missions

Empire, Liberty, and Hudson Charter Schools' founding missions and curricular themes are each oriented around pedagogical models that emphasize inquiry and hands-on learning rather than on the highly regulated, "no-excuses" approach common among CMOs.^{xi} The founders of each school saw the charter model, given its relative autonomy from some district regulations, as an ideal way to institute their educational visions. Further, these schools' founders and leaders, in various ways, aimed to enroll a diverse student population as a means to advancing equity in a city deeply segregated by race, class, language, and disability.^{xii} Finally, each of these schools have instituted distinct leadership structures intended to empower teachers and distribute responsibilities across various layers of the organization, harkening back to the community-empowerment goals of the earliest charter schools.^{xiii}

To illustrate, Empire's founders, all experienced educators, aimed to serve a racially and socioeconomically integrated population in a gentrifying neighborhood through progressive pedagogy. Liberty was founded by parents and community members who saw the need for an unscreened middle school in a neighborhood where most public schools were academically selective. At Liberty, students study environmental, economic, and social sustainability through hands-on, interdisciplinary approaches. Finally, Hudson, a unionized school, was established by educators in the 1990s as a traditional public school rooted in inquiry-based, experiential learning and global citizenship development. Hudson later converted to charter status in order to deepen its alternative pedagogical and organizational practices.

Organization of this Research Brief

This research brief proceeds in five sections. First, I review the scholarly literature on the intersection of progressive education and charter schooling. Second, I present the conceptual framework that guided this study. Third, I provide a summary of this study's findings. The final two sections discuss recommendations for policy and practice.

Literature Review: The Intersection of Progressive Education and Charter Schooling

The Pedagogical and Political Goals of Progressive Education

The Progressive Movement in education emerged in the early 1900s against the backdrop of increasing industrialization, immigration, and urbanization in America. Progressive reformers were concerned with the preservation of democratic values amid such massive social change, and saw schools as a vehicle for facilitating democracy. At the forefront of progressive education was philosopher John Dewey, who called for pedagogical practices that would undo the individualism and materialism that he believed were undermining democratic life.^{xiv} Dewey argued that the school should operate as "a miniature community, an embryonic society," where children would learn the skills and habits of democratic citizens.^{xv} To foster democratic learning, Dewey called for experiential, inquiry-based pedagogy, wherein teachers supported children's natural curiosities rather than imposing learning through direct instruction and rote

memorization. Rather than the minimal student engagement and motivation undergirding teacher-led instruction, child-centered experiential learning, according to Dewey, “enables [the student] to see within his daily work all there is in it of large and human significance.”^{xxvi}

Extending Dewey’s call for schools to “[train] each child of society into membership within such a little community, saturating him with the spirit of service,” some progressive educators aimed to develop students’ awareness and understanding of social inequalities within their communities and how to address them.^{xxvii} In this way, progressive education came to take on explicitly political aims, in addition to pedagogical ones. For example, in the summer of 1964, civil rights activists affiliated with the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) and Congress for Racial Equality (CORE) established Freedom Schools in Mississippi in response to inadequate schooling conditions for Black children in the state.^{xxviii} Volunteer teachers from SNCC and CORE instituted child-centered, inquiry-based pedagogy as a way to foster self-determination and empowerment among Black students. Mississippi’s Freedom Schools inspired year-round “Free Schools,” in response to what Free School advocates argued was a public school system that continually oppressed children of color. Both Freedom Schools and Free Schools were guided by the notion that small, self-governing schools, unfettered from the bureaucratic public school system, furthered the democratic aims of education.^{xix} Yet amid limited resources and support, and an increasingly conservative political climate that eschewed alternative approaches, Free Schools eventually dwindled and closed.^{xx}

However, other alternative public schools guided by similar progressive and equity-oriented philosophies endure to this day, largely spurred on by policy and political support for small schools.^{xxi} Among the most well-known are the Central Park East Schools in New York City, founded by progressive educator Deborah Meier. The Central Park East Schools serve poor communities of color residing in the surrounding neighborhood of East Harlem.^{xxii} Heavily influenced by John Dewey, Meier’s schools are oriented around inquiry-based learning and problem solving as a means to developing students’ democratic “habits of mind.” Similar schools incorporating progressive pedagogical and political aims exist across the United States and reflect Dewey’s call for experiential learning as a vehicle for fostering students’ citizenship development.^{xxiii}

Charter Schools as a Progressive Alternative to Traditional Public Schools

Progressive, alternative public schools, such Central Park East, owe their existence to a market system that fosters the establishment of alternative schools of choice.^{xxiv} The same market system supports progressive charter schools, whose lineage Forman traces to the Free Schools of the 1960s and 1970s.^{xxv} Indeed, similar to Free School advocates, many early charter school supporters sought student-centered alternatives to a bureaucratic, oppressive, and politically disempowering public school system.^{xxvi} Many charter proponents sought to leverage the charter model’s autonomy in order to institute progressive education for both pedagogical and political purposes. For example, some charters aimed specifically to serve an at-risk student population, such as students with severe disabilities.^{xxvii} In addition, some charter school leaders leveraged their autonomy to explicitly focus on enrolling racially diverse populations.^{xxviii} Other charters instituted an ethnocentric approach, established by, and focused on meeting the needs of, communities of color historically marginalized by the traditional public school system.^{xxix} Together, these community-based and ethnocentric charters reflected Dewey’s claim that schools should operate as “a miniature community, an embryonic society,” where children engage and

are valued as citizens, even when the broader society outside the school walls may not regard them as such.^{xxx}

The Marketization of Charter Schools: Obscuring Charters' Progressive Goals

However, reflecting a long history of how market tenets overshadow the progressive aims of school choice, by the first decade of the twenty-first century, the charter school movement was virtually entirely aligned with the values undergirding the broader marketization of public education—accountability, choice, efficiency, and privatization—hence obscuring the charter movement's progressive pedagogical and political aims.^{xxxii} For example, following the 2002 federal *No Child Left Behind* Act, policymakers and advocates embraced charter schools as an ideal school turnaround option for public schools failing to meet “Adequate Yearly Progress,” and, in many districts under mayoral control or state takeover, such as New York City, New Orleans, and Chicago, mayors or state governors facilitated the expansion of charters to replace shuttered public schools.^{xxxiii} Furthermore, as evidence of how charters are tied to privatization, whereas the earliest charters were founded and managed by educators, families, and local communities, charters are increasingly operated by for-profit and nonprofit management organizations seeking to infuse business principles into public schooling.^{xxxiii}

The contemporary marketization of charter schools is perhaps best exemplified by the expansion of CMOs. CMOs operate “networks” of charter schools via a central office as a means of “scaling up” the charter sector efficiently and rapidly serving increasing numbers of students, in turn achieving economies of scale.^{xxxiv} Although independent charters outnumber CMOs nationally, the expansion of CMOs has far outpaced that of independent charters. In 2015, over half of charter schools nationally were unaffiliated with any management organization. However, from 2005 to 2015, the number of CMOs in the United States more than doubled, from 674 to 1,882.^{xxxv}

Scholars argue that independent, community-based charters, more so than their market-oriented counterparts, are uniquely positioned to advance a progressive, equity-oriented agenda, because they tend to be founded upon equity- and democracy-oriented pedagogical, social, or political missions more so than the market values of accountability, choice, privatization, and economies of scale.^{xxxvi} Yet the literature also demonstrates that the progressive, equity-oriented missions of independent charters are fragile in a market-based policy and political context. This context encourages charter schools to respond to market competition by pursuing a growth strategy, garnering private funding, and enacting selective enrollment policies.^{xxxvii} For example, scholars demonstrate how market pressures compelled a dual-language charter school to adjust its pedagogical mission in order to appear institutionally legitimate and attract philanthropic funding.^{xxxviii} Similar research illustrates how independent, community-based charters were pushed to adopt a data-driven, test-oriented instructional approach in order to attract resources, thus constraining teachers' autonomy and innovation.^{xxxix} Together, this research demonstrates that a market-oriented policy context stifles the progressive founding missions of many independent charters and instead incentivizes practices aligned with market values.

How Do Progressive Charter Schools Survive in a Market-Oriented Policy Context?

To date, the extant literature on independent charter schools founded upon progressive missions demonstrates the link between schools' *internal* pedagogical and operational practices and their ability to survive in a market context. Yet independent charters' *external* activities, or how they engage in the political arena to mobilize political, financial, and ideological support to

maximize organizational survival, remains under-examined. This study extends the research on charter schools by investigating the relationship between independent charters’ internal and external practices, or how schools’ pedagogical, operational, and political practices were intertwined. In doing so, I shed light on the possibilities for a progressive, equity- and democracy-oriented education reform agenda in a market-oriented landscape, and the conditions under which such an agenda can take place.

Conceptual Framework: What Charter Schools Do, Have, and Know to Survive

This study’s conceptual framework draws upon the empirical literature to explain what charter schools “do,” “have,” and “know” in order to survive, and is modeled after Scott and Villavicencio’s conceptual framework for explaining charter schools’ student achievement outcomes.^{x1} Scott and Villavicencio’s framework draws from the empirical literature to highlight what charter schools: (a) do, or their practices related to curriculum, admissions, and governance; (b) have, or their resources; and (c) know, or the knowledge and capacity of school leaders, staff, and board trustees. In accounting for the relationship across these three dimensions, Scott and Villavicencio illuminate how in-school factors interact with contextual conditions to shape charter students’ academic performance, providing a nuanced and holistic view of how charter schools impact student achievement.

Similarly, I incorporate these three dimensions in a framework that draws upon the empirical literature to explain what market-oriented charters do, have, and know in order to survive and retain a competitive edge in the market context. This framework allowed me to identify whether, and to what extent, independent charters founded upon progressive values exhibited similar practices, resources, and capacities, in turn adapting to the market context and experiencing “mission drift.”^{xli} The framework also enabled me to see how, if at all, progressive charters displayed alternative practices, resources, and capacities in order to maximize organizational survival while maintaining fidelity to their founding missions. Finally, the framework attends to the equity implications of what charters do, have, and know, and enabled an investigation of how independent charters’ efforts to survive advance or constrain equitable education. Table 1 summarizes the framework’s components.

Do	Have	Know
Selective enrollment	Affiliation with management organization	Outcomes-oriented pedagogy and discipline
Strategic marketing and advertising	Access to high-status donors	Managerial expertise
Replication and expansion	Relationships with alternative teacher and leader preparation programs	How to network and build alliances across sectors
	Support from political advocacy coalitions	

Table 1. A framework for explaining charter school survival in the market context

What Market-Oriented Charters Do: Internal Organizational Practices

A common practice among charters is to selectively enroll students in response to accountability pressures and market competition, maximizing their enrollment of high-achieving students. School leaders selectively enroll through a combination of “cropping” and “cream-

skimming” techniques.^{xlii} For example, some charters serve few to no students with disabilities or English language learners and have high attrition rates, suggesting that low-performing students are pushed out over time.^{xliii} A related body of research demonstrates that charter schools enact strategic marketing and advertising practices to attract desirable students.^{xliv} Yet the research also demonstrates how charters’ marketing efforts undermine equity by stratifying opportunity along the lines of race and class.^{xlv} This research also critiques the lack of public transparency around charters’ marketing practices.^{xlvi}

In addition, as exemplified by the CMO model, a market environment incentivizes charters to replicate and expand in order to capture a larger segment of choosers in the choice market and gain an advantage over competitor schools.^{xlvii} Large charter operations are also better resourced to build a recognizable brand that would further attract resources, political support, and prospective families.^{xlviii} Yet researchers also point out that, when charters scale up rapidly, they may compromise quality.^{xlix}

What Market-Oriented Charters Have: Organizational, Human Capital, Financial, and Political Resources

Given varying levels of local and state funding for charter schools, affiliating with a for-profit or nonprofit management organization or other external partner facilitates charters’ access to organizational, human capital, and financial resources.¹ Specifically, research on CMOs highlights how this model is designed to centralize operational tasks and expenses to increase organizational capacity.^{li} Charters with external partnerships or affiliations such as with CMOs also enjoy disproportionate access to wealthy “venture philanthropists,” such as the Broad, Gates, and Walton Foundations, which “tend to favor market-based hallmarks such as competition, standardization, and high-stakes accountability” in charter schools.^{lii}

Another resource to which market-oriented charters often have access are alternative teacher and leader preparation programs, such as Teach For America (TFA), through formal partnerships that maintain a pipeline of teachers.^{liii} TFA and similar organizations also lend political support to advocacy efforts aimed at advancing market-oriented charter policies.^{liv} Relatedly, market-oriented charters enjoy support from a robust coalition of politically powerful charter school advocates.^{lv} Venture philanthropists are at the center of this coalition, supporting charter schools directly as well as many organizations producing and disseminating research casting market-oriented charters favorably.^{lvi}

What Market-Oriented Charters Know: Ideas and Expertise to Inform Practice

Research demonstrates that charter leaders perceive outcomes-oriented practices as one way to improve a charter’s market position.^{lvii} Accordingly, many charters, particularly CMOs, institute a no-excuses approach to pedagogy and discipline, maintaining a highly regulated, compliance-based environment in order to minimize distractions from learning and advance student achievement.^{lviii} However, while no-excuses pedagogy may effectively produce high test scores, it often fall short of addressing students’ civic or socioemotional learning.^{lix}

An additional area of knowledge held among market-oriented charters is managerial expertise. Many charters, particularly those in urban areas and affiliated with CMOs, are founded and led by business professionals with little to no experience in public schools.^{lx} These business-minded charter leaders believe that private sector practices will improve the bureaucratic politics that impede the efficacy of public education.^{lxi} Finally, and related to charters’ affiliations with external partners and advocacy organizations discussed above, many charters hold expertise in

networking and building alliances across the nonprofit, for-profit, and public sectors in order to enhance resource, organizational, and political capacity.^{lxii} To network and build alliances, many charters rely not only on managerial experts, as discussed above, but also on what Wells et al. describe as “charismatic leaders,” individuals who “tend to wield a great deal of political power and symbolic capital that helps them get what they need for their schools.”^{lxiii}

Examining the Survival of Progressive Charter Schools in a Market Context

To explain how charter schools oriented around progressive tenets survive, I investigated what the leaders, board trustees, and advocates of Empire, Hudson, and Liberty did, had, and knew, with attention to whether each school exhibited similar or different characteristics than those captured in the above framework. I approached my study with the assumption that alignment with what market-oriented charters do, have, and know would suggest mission drift, or departure from their founding mission.^{lxiv} Conversely, should each school’s leaders, board trustees, and advocates exhibit practices, resources, and knowledge not captured by the framework, this would suggest that they are resisting market pressures in the effort to maintain fidelity to their founding missions, yet perhaps at risk to their school’s survival. Furthermore, as noted above, what market-oriented charters do, have, and know often exacerbate inequitable education, particularly along race and class. In my study, this framework allowed me to attend to how, if at all, the focal charters’ practices, resources, and knowledge advanced inequities or remedied them.

Summary of Findings

In this section, I organize the findings into four parts. First, I discuss challenges to survival evident across all focal schools. Then, I describe (a) what charters did, or their specific internal practices, (b) what charters had, or their access to particular kinds of human capital, financial, and political resources, and (c) what charters knew, or what areas of knowledge or expertise they had to inform organizational capacity and practice. I also discuss the ways in which what charters did, had, and knew impacted equitable educational opportunity and access.

Challenges to Survival

Interviewees across all three schools noted several common challenges to survival. First, limited state funding for charter schools constrained their budgets. Indeed, state per-pupil funding for charter school students has lagged behind that for traditional public school students since the 2009–2010 school year, when the Governor and State Legislature froze the charter school funding formula in order to cut costs on the heels of Great Recession. The state lifted the freeze in the following year, raising charter per-pupil funding slightly by about \$1,000. But the state enacted the freeze again in 2013, and state legislation in 2014 set the charter per-pupil amount at its 2010–2011 level. Although in subsequent years, the state provided modest supplements to the charter per-pupil amount, the total charter per-pupil amount continues to be less than that for traditional public school students.^{lxv}

The state funding freeze presented a particular issue for Hudson, as state funding for charters has not kept pace with the salary increases stipulated in collective bargaining agreements negotiated by the unions representing New York City teachers, administrators, and staff. Although Liberty and Empire were not unionized, this issue affected them as well, as they strove to offer teachers a salary competitive with that determined by the United Federation of

Teachers in order to attract high-quality staff. In addition, for Liberty, enrollment challenges exacerbated the school's financial difficulties. In remaining under-enrolled, Liberty's public per-pupil funding allocation was limited, while operational expenses, such as facilities rental, were based on full enrollment.

Interviewees across schools also expressed that public misperceptions of charter schools presented an additional challenge to survival. For example, Hudson's leaders noted that, because there are only three unionized charter schools in New York City, the Department of Education and City Hall often do not understand such schools' unique financial challenges. At Liberty and Empire, interviewees perceived that negative perceptions of charters, reinforced by extensive public attention on CMOs, sometimes constrained their efforts to attract prospective students and donors. Moreover, limited time and capacity presented a challenge particularly for newer schools Liberty and Empire, constraining school leaders' and board trustees' ability to engage in fundraising and political advocacy. As I discuss below, this was less of an issue for Hudson, which employed staff who devoted the bulk of their time to development, outreach, and political engagement. Finally, especially at Liberty and Empire, interviewees perceived low student achievement as a challenge to organizational survival. Indeed, board trustees and school leaders expressed concern that students' test scores would affect their charter renewal prospects.

What They Did: Internal Organizational Practices

Strategic marketing and advertising. Across all three schools, leaders and board trustees endeavored to address their financial challenges through direct fundraising appeals, which often involved marketing the school to prospective donors. For example, teachers raised funds for their classrooms through the Donors Choose website, a platform through which teachers solicit monetary donations for supplies or activities. According to Wilson and Carlsen, school websites operate as marketing mechanisms by projecting a particular image about the school as a way to attract applicants.^{lxvi} Similarly, Donors Choose pages leverage online marketing capacities to attract donors. However, somewhat at odds with each school's founding mission to advance equitable education, requiring teachers to act as "grantseekers" fosters their participation in an unequal market environment that commoditizes teaching, does not ensure equitable resource distribution, and encourages competition for limited resources. Moreover, such a system disproportionately advantages teachers with access to affluent networks.^{lxvii}

In addition, in response to competition from other schools within its Community School District (CSD), Liberty leaders and board trustees instituted various marketing and advertising practices centered on building its brand. These included producing a promotional video and launching a brand awareness campaign on social media. Efforts to build Liberty's brand focused on leveraging the school's sustainability theme and promoting its high school placement record. Interviewees shared that the school's branding efforts led to increased interest from CSD families, as intended. However, researchers argue that strategic branding efforts enmesh schools in a competitive market environment that commodifies education.^{lxviii}

Targeted student outreach and recruitment. Researchers similarly illustrate how, in addition to strategic marketing and branding, schools market themselves to potential clients through targeted outreach, a practice observed particularly at Liberty and Empire, both located in CSDs with numerous competitor schools.^{lxix} Each of these schools created staff positions focused on student outreach and recruitment. These schools especially targeted recruitment of one or more "special populations"—students with disabilities, economically-disadvantaged students, and English language learners—to realize their mission to enroll a diverse student body. In

addition, these schools instituted lottery preferences for at least one category of special student populations.

Selective enrollment. However, alongside its lottery preference for economically-disadvantaged students, Empire’s co-leaders and board trustees altered the school’s enrollment policy in order to improve its test scores. The original admissions policy stated in Empire’s charter application demonstrated the co-leaders’ early commitment to ensuring equitable access to an Empire education through backfilling, or offering available seats to students at any point in the school year. However, in spring 2018, the co-leaders and board decided no longer to backfill empty seats in the testing grades, or third grade and above. Instituting a policy that puts an end to backfilling was evidence of the co-leaders’ and board trustees’ response to an accountability-driven market where student achievement is perceived to matter for organizational survival.

Replication and expansion. Although interviewees across the three schools discussed the prospect of expansion, at the time of data collection, only Hudson had an expansion plan in place: it had received approval from its state authorizer to operate a second charter school, scheduled to open in 2020. At Empire, the Board of Trustees rejected the co-leaders’ proposal to add a pre-K class in fall 2018, noting the financial and operational burden. At both Empire and Hudson, the perceived benefits of school expansion were to expand educational choice for local families and to meet the high community demand for each school’s educational model. For Hudson, an additional reason to expand was to foster efficient use of shared resources across two campuses. At Empire, those supporting pre-K expansion noted that doing so would provide a continuous progressive educational experience.

However, in discussing the disadvantages to expansion, few interviewees at Hudson and Empire remarked on how expanding school choice could exacerbate competition and inequity.^{lxx} One exception was an Empire board trustee, who acknowledged that should Empire start a pre-K program, it would inevitably compete with neighborhood preschools for students, leading these programs to “feel like we’re poaching their kids.” In addition to stoking ill-will, pre-K at Empire would siphon public funds away from other neighborhood public pre-K programs. The same funding dynamics would likely play out across Hudson and its competitor schools. Finally, scholars demonstrate how high demand for charter schools often operates alongside gentrification, an important consideration for Hudson and Empire, which are each located in gentrifying neighborhoods. This research illustrates how, as neighborhoods gentrify, White and wealthy families often reject the local public schools in favor of so-called “prestige charters.” This pattern reinforces school segregation even when charters may “claim concerted efforts to create and foster diversity,” as Empire and Hudson do.^{lxxi}

Discouraging “opt-out.” Across all three schools, interviewees acknowledged the limits of standardized tests and critiqued their centrality to their charter agreement. Yet they appeared to do little to push back on them, and hence seemed to accept their role in the contemporary “audit culture.”^{lxxii} To illustrate, particularly at Hudson and Empire, school leaders and board trustees discouraged student and family activism around “opting out” of standardized tests, perceiving test score data to matter for attracting political and financial support for the school’s charter renewal prospects. Thus, despite their founding mission to educate the whole child through varied learning experiences, including leadership and activism, the prevalence of test-based accountability in the current market-oriented educational environment compelled Hudson and Empire’s leaders to compromise some aspects of this mission to generate the data that they believed would bring much-needed resources and political support to the school.

What They Had: Organizational, Human Capital, Financial, and Political Resources

Development staff. Among the three schools, Hudson was unique in employing a full-time development staff member who wrote grants, organized fundraisers, and secured institutional partnerships and other in-kind supports for the school. In this way, Hudson's administration resembled a CMO home office, which often employs full-time development and grant-writing staff.^{lxxiii} However, unlike many CMOs, most grants Hudson received were for small amounts of \$2,000 to \$5,000, targeted for a specific purpose, such as the school drama program, rooftop garden, or curricular projects. In addition, Hudson's development staff created a dedicated fundraising board, a 501(c)3 nonprofit organization. The four-member board aimed to center its fundraising on mobilizing Hudson's alumni, though board members acknowledged limits to this form of fundraising, as Hudson's alumni base is relatively thin and not very affluent. In contrast, at Liberty and Empire, fundraising and development were relegated to one or more school leaders who were responsible for additional aspects of school operations and management. The boards of trustees at these schools also assisted with securing external funding, as I discuss in greater detail below.

Across all three schools, due to differing fundraising capacities, leaders achieved varying levels of success at securing government and foundation grants. All schools were more successful at attracting small grants of \$5,000 or less to support discrete programs, often those tied to the school's mission, relative to larger, sustaining gifts. Some interviewees lamented that major philanthropic organizations overlooked independent charters in favor of CMOs. However, other interviewees explained that they would not accept funds from philanthropists such as the Gates or Walton Foundations, as they perceived these organizations' missions to conflict with their school's commitment to supporting families from marginalized communities.

Access to affluent donors via the board of trustees. Each school's founding board comprised individuals with a diverse range of expertise, including education, child development, business, real estate, and finance. Many founding board members included those who were involved in developing the school and writing its charter application. However, across schools, boards more recently have recruited new members with "give and get" potential: the ability to make a financial contribution directly or facilitate "connections to deep pockets," as one school leader remarked. The strategy to recruit such board trustees is consistent with Scott and Holme's observation that charters often intentionally select for their governing boards individuals with access to affluent networks.^{lxxiv} For example, Liberty increasingly relied on board recruitment pipelines such as Columbia Business School and Bridgespan, while Empire leveraged its founding board's extensive professional networks in the business and finance industries. Hudson was less engaged in recruiting affluent board trustees. The majority of its board comprised current or former staff members and parents, though its most recent addition was an alumnus employed in the finance sector.

Across schools, attending to the board's give-and-get potential was evidence of their response to a competitive market environment where the ability to mobilize resources is highly contingent on charters' connections to affluent networks. Yet as researchers point out, the market system enables charters with such connections to accrue more resources than charters lacking such ties. This competitive environment "[enables] some schools to maintain or create their privilege, while other schools fall even further behind," perpetuating vast resource inequities.^{lxxv}

Geographic proximity to an affluent community. Researchers also demonstrate that a charter school's geographic location matters greatly to its ability to access resources: "Schools located in high-status communities have strong and weak ties to many resources, and are

therefore able to tap easily into financial, social, and economic capital in their community.”^{lxxvi} Liberty and Empire in particular appeared to benefit from geographic proximity to affluent communities. Both schools were situated within an economically-diverse CSD comprising multiple small neighborhoods reflecting a range of income levels, from less than \$45,000 to over \$100,000. Although nearly 60% of Liberty’s students were classified as economically-disadvantaged in 2017–2018, Liberty’s 990 IRS tax form for 2016 indicates that individual contributions, gifts, and grants totaled slightly over \$86,000, illustrating the robust collective ability of Liberty’s community and networks to contribute. Compared to Liberty, Empire enrolled a smaller share of economically-disadvantaged students, around 25%. The relative affluence of Empire families was reflected in the Board of Trustees’ financial reports, which indicated that each year to date generated over \$100,000 in donations and fundraising. These financial data illustrate how geographic proximity to affluent communities lent both Empire and Liberty a competitive advantage over schools located in their CSD’s less affluent areas.

Important to note is that Empire’s White, affluent, and professional parents largely drove the school’s fundraising efforts, and struggled at times to render fundraising initiatives inclusive of less affluent families. Empire’s co-leaders sometimes mitigated against exclusionary fundraising practices such as expensive parent fundraisers. Yet overall, Empire’s fundraising efforts highlight the challenges that arise when disproportionately affluent and White parents have the time and capacity to organize fundraising events and, in doing so, draw primarily upon their own values, preferences, and perspectives. As Posey-Maddox argues, although deep engagement from affluent parent volunteers can benefit a school, their work often also marginalizes poor families and deepens inequity.^{lxxvii}

Partnerships with external organizations and consultants. To varying degrees, each school partnered with external organizations to build their capacity for political engagement and fundraising, reflecting research demonstrating that charters affiliate with for-profit or non-profit firms to facilitate their access to organizational, human capital, and financial resources.^{lxxviii} For example, all three schools were affiliated with the Coalition for Community Charter Schools (C3S), an organization founded in 2013 by independent charter school leaders in order to bring more political visibility to independent charters and counter the political and financial dominance of CMOs. Among the three schools, Hudson was most actively involved in C3S, whereas interviewees from Empire and Liberty explained that time and capacity constraints limited their involvement with this group.

All three schools were also affiliated with the New York City Charter School Center (“Charter Center”), a technical assistance and advocacy organization, though Empire and Liberty relied more on this organization compared to Hudson. Indeed, Hudson’s Director of Operations explained that the Charter Center staff were less helpful than her counterparts at other conversion charter schools regarding issues related to operations and advocacy: “I used to go [to the Charter Center] in the early days to make connections, but... a lot of it just doesn’t apply, because we are so unique. [With] the union status, our financial structure is very different.” In contrast, operations staff from Liberty and Empire noted their continued reliance on the Charter Center for technical assistance and to connect with the growing market of charter school consultants, who provided support in such areas as payroll, accounting, and the charter renewal process. Unlike Empire and Liberty, Hudson did not contract with consultants for school operations and charter renewal tasks, but it did contract with a boutique lobbying and government relations firm. Interviewees from Hudson explained that that lobbying elected officials, more so than fundraising through grants or direct appeals, was the most effective way to bring money into the

school through legislative change. Indeed, Hudson's lobbyist helped to secure Senate appropriations funding, to be shared among New York City's three conversion schools.

One Charter Center staff member explained that the market of charter school consultants has expanded in response to growth in the charter school sector: "We're a billion-dollar environment because of the amount of money per-pupil as well as the amount of money in facility access, facility support, and all that, making a much more enticing opportunity. We've seen an explosion of vendors and contractors in the last 2 years, 18 months even." This individual's comments echo the burgeoning literature on how charter schools have created an adjacent marketplace of nonprofit and for-profit firms drawn to the prospect of profiting from a booming industry.^{lxxxix} Yet while schools such as Empire, Liberty, and Hudson present a lucrative business opportunity to the growing marketplace of charter school consultants and contractors, they may be more interested in gaining from "the billion-dollar charter environment" than in advancing equitable education.

Community partnerships and support. Finally, all schools, in distinct ways, benefited from local community support, via formal or informal partnerships. For example, interviewees from Hudson credited the school's longevity to support from local civic and cultural organizations, including groups that are generally politically opposed to charter schools. Community support was evident in the array of stakeholders who supported Hudson's application for a second charter school. Hudson's principal commented, "We have spent lots of time building good relationships in the community, which I think is hugely important, and I think it's one of the reasons we're still here today, because we do have people who are our friends." A Hudson board member and alumnus similarly explained that the community service and internship components of Hudson's curriculum deepen the school's ties to the community.

Compared with Hudson, Empire and Liberty have had fewer years to develop community ties. Nevertheless, the founders and leaders of each school engaged in extensive community outreach to build support for each school's opening and renewal. For example, a staffer for a City Councilmember explained how Liberty's outreach efforts prior to opening contrasted with the lack of such initiatives from charters such as Success Academy, which opened schools without community input. Interviewees from Liberty and Empire also noted that community members, including local elected officials, supported each school's founding missions to enroll a diverse population. Importantly, interviewees at Empire reflected on how strong political and financial support from White and affluent community members benefits Empire financially and politically, yet also undermines its mission to foster racial and socioeconomic inclusivity, particularly as gentrification intensifies. Their comments reflect Brown and Makris's findings that gentrification facilitates the popularity of certain charter schools among White and affluent families, in turn lending such schools a veneer of prestige typically reserved for elite private schools.^{lxxx}

What They Knew: Ideas and Expertise to Inform Practice

Institutional memory. Many of Hudson's first staff members and parents continued to be involved in the school, contributing a deep institutional memory of the school's evolution since the mid-1990s. For instance, nearly all of Hudson's current administrators began their tenure as parent volunteers in the 1990s. In addition, many of Hudson's academic leaders have had a decade or more of teaching experience at Hudson. Moreover, Hudson's Board of Trustees included numerous individuals who similarly have had years of involvement in the school, whether as a founding staff member, alumnus, teacher, or parent. In turn, Hudson's leadership

team and governing board have honed a deep understanding of, and investment in, the school's mission. This stands in stark contrast to the leadership and boards of many CMOs, whose members tend not to have much educational experience, hailing instead from professional backgrounds in business, nonprofit management, and law.^{lxxxii} Hudson's longstanding staff also contrasts with research demonstrating high levels of teacher turnover at charters, particularly CMOs.^{lxxxiii}

“Political savvy.” In addition to having cultivated robust institutional memory, over the last 2 decades, Hudson's leaders have developed much knowledge regarding the political arena surrounding charter schools and how to navigate it. This deep knowledge was on display during Hudson's participation in the annual Charter School Advocacy Day, organized by two charter advocacy organizations, the Charter Center and Northeast Charter School Network (NECSN). During this event, held every February, the Charter Center and NECSN provide free transportation for charter school staff, students, and parents travel to Albany and lobby their elected officials for increased charter school funding and a more hospitable state policy environment for charters. These organizations also provide training videos, pamphlets, and “talking points” to guide conversations with elected officials. However, during the February 2018 Advocacy Day, representatives from Hudson appeared to have their own script. In a meeting with a staffer in the office of Hudson's State Senator, Hudson staff explained the budgetary challenges that stem from Hudson's status as a unionized charter school, and requested that the Senator ask the Mayor to provide additional funding for conversion charter schools. Here, Hudson leaders took advantage of the free transportation to Albany and other Advocacy Day logistics, but lobbied on behalf of their own interests, rather than those advanced by the Charter Center and NECSN. Interviewees agreed that Hudson's principal deserves much credit for cultivating Hudson's political knowledge and skills, describing her as a skilled political operative. Arguably, regular engagement in the political arena has helped Hudson's principal to develop her political knowledge and skills; by her own estimation, she devotes forty to fifty percent of her time to political advocacy. Hudson's administrative structure enables her to do so, as academic leadership is devolved to other senior staff.

Outcomes-oriented pedagogy. At Liberty and Empire, evidence revealed some explicit test preparation across grades, including incorporating instructional units on test preparation, instituting after-school tutoring, assigning practice test questions for homework, and administering practice tests. An outcomes-oriented instructional approach stood in contrast to each school's founding pedagogical mission to nurture students' learning through interdisciplinary exploration and inquiry. However, leaders and board trustees at each school felt compelled to adjust these founding missions in response to modest levels of student achievement to date. At the time of data collection, Liberty remained under-enrolled, and interviewees posited that Liberty's student achievement data, which were lower than CSD averages, dissuaded families from applying. Similarly, at Empire, perceiving low test scores as negatively impacting student retention and possibly putting the school's renewal at risk, Empire's co-leaders adjusted its progressive curriculum in order to raise student achievement.

Interviewees from both schools expressed mixed views regarding the ideal balance between upholding the school's founding commitment to an interdisciplinary, experiential curriculum and making concerted efforts to improve student achievement through explicit test preparation. One Empire board trustee described test prep as “a necessary evil.” Nevertheless, in incorporating outcomes-oriented pedagogy, Empire and Liberty departed from a philosophy emphasizing the learning process to one emphasizing learning outcomes. In this way,

Empire’s and Liberty’s instructional approaches increasingly resembled a market-oriented one, defining student success in terms of narrow quantitative measures, an approach that researchers argue does little to nurture students’ curiosities.^{lxxxiii} Moreover, increased reliance on outcomes-oriented pedagogy impeded curricular and instructional innovation, undermining each school’s intention to provide an alternative to the more traditional academic approaches across competitor schools. Each school’s explicit attention to raising student outcomes as a response to perceived competition and accountability pressures is consistent with the literature demonstrating that charter leaders react to competition and accountability by instituting curricular changes aimed at lifting student achievement.^{lxxxiv}

Managerial expertise. As discussed above, many charter schools strategically build their leadership and board rosters with managerial expertise under the assumption that management and business professionals are skilled at facilitating organizational efficacy.^{lxxxv} Similarly, across this study’s focal schools, governing boards expanded their numbers of business and finance professionals. This pattern was especially pronounced at Empire and Liberty. At Liberty, for example, one board trustee was employed at a CMO; this individual’s knowledge of CMO branding, student outreach, and staff recruitment informed Liberty’s own approaches. Similarly, at Empire, the charter renewal process appeared to have ignited the push to professionalize its board by building its roster of individuals with expertise and skills in charter fundraising and management. Indeed, new additions to Empire’s board in 2018 included a former CMO administrator and an individual employed in the finance industry.

At both Empire and Liberty, added managerial expertise appeared to improve the board’s efficiency and ability to hold each school accountable to its performance goals. However, these examples also illustrate limited opportunities for incorporating community perspectives in board governance, undermining Liberty and Empire’s founding missions to serve as community-based charter schools. Indeed, whereas eight of Liberty’s 11-member founding team were residents of the CSD, whose children attended CSD public schools, the more recently recruited business and CMO experts resided outside the district. Similarly, at the time of data collection, Empire increased the number of finance and management professionals on its board, but did not add any parent or community representatives. Focusing on the governing board’s managerial expertise may have stemmed from market pressures, as CMOs, often led by business and finance professionals, enjoyed “market leader” status and hence set the parameters for what a legitimate and successful charter school looks like.^{lxxxvi}

Recommendations for Policy: Advancing Equitable and Inclusive Education

This study demonstrated the challenges associated with instituting progressive education in a market context, given the tensions between progressive tenets and market values. Despite the constraints of the market, Empire, Liberty, and Hudson each maintained some aspects of a progressive education. These included regular art classes, a gender identity curriculum, and community service projects at Empire; interdisciplinary project blocks at Liberty; and community service activities and an annual project-based learning week at Hudson. However, a market context that encourages organizational advancement and survival, more so than progressive pedagogy and politics, limited each school from realizing a more expansive definition of progressive education, one tied to a broader agenda to advance educational access and empowerment for marginalized communities.^{lxxxvii}

To be clear, that each school adjusted its founding progressive mission in practice does not reflect shortcomings within particular educators or board trustees, whom I observed working very hard to serve their students well. Rather, it reflects an education policy context that incentivizes not progressive education, but rather, a market-oriented approach to schooling. This market environment fosters the perpetuation of unequal education by encouraging competition for scarce resources, defining student achievement in terms of narrow quantitative measures, and rewarding schools already enjoying relative privilege.

Creating an environment more supportive of progressive education requires policy solutions. Such policies would be situated within a progressive political agenda oriented around racial equity, economic security, and democracy, much as the progressive educational movements of the 1960s and 1970s were situated within larger political movements for social change.^{lxxxviii} An ideological shift toward progressivism will be gradual, but evidence of burgeoning progressive politics in New York and nationally suggests that a shift may be underway. Against this backdrop, I offer the following recommendations for policy.

Policies that Ensure Equitable Enrollment and Admissions

Progressive charter school policies would include those that prevent selective enrollment practices by requiring charters to backfill all available seats mid-year, hence maximizing equitable educational opportunity and access. Relatedly, progressive policies would require that charters enroll a diverse population in terms of race, class, home language, and learning needs. Particularly in locales such as New York City, where CSDs cover relatively large geographic areas that are highly stratified by race and class, progressive charter policies would provide free transportation for students in order to facilitate inclusive and integrated schools. Similarly, progressive charter admissions policies would ensure that charter school application information is widely and equitably distributed in order to mitigate against targeted student recruitment efforts that may facilitate access for some while limiting access for others. Together, such admissions and enrollment policies would buffer against segregation and prevent a divide between prestige charters enrolling primarily White and affluent children, and those deemed less prestigious by virtue of their enrolling primarily poor students and students of color.^{lxxxix}

Policies that Ensure Equitable Resource Distribution

The cases of Hudson, Liberty, and Empire illustrate the inequities that result from the combination of constrained public funding for charter schools as well as a market environment that encourages competition for limited public and private funding. Indeed, Hudson, Liberty, and Empire, to various degrees, enjoyed numerous financial resource advantages given their connections to affluent and high-status networks, allowing these schools to get ahead while less-resourced schools fell farther behind. Hence, a progressive charter school policy agenda would ensure equitable resource distribution, targeting resources specifically to schools in poor communities, hence eliminating steep competition for scarce resources from private funders.^{xc} Resources include high-quality and experienced teachers, who are costlier than novice ones. Thus, a progressive charter policy agenda would ensure sufficient funding for charters to compensate qualified and experienced staff.

Policies that Ensure Public Transparency and Accountability

Charter school marketing and contractor fees often take away from funds that could support teaching and learning.^{xc1} Policies that ensure equitable resource distribution would

obviate the need for charters to contract services to the private sector, allowing them instead to devote resources to developing and instituting progressive curricula and programming. Moreover, as researchers have demonstrated, public taxpayer dollars largely support marketing and contracting expenses, yet without any mechanisms for ensuring public transparency or accountability. This in turn undermines the collective responsibility dimension of progressive education.^{xcii} Hence, progressive charter school policies would ensure public transparency of all charters' expenses and enact meaningful public accountability mechanisms.

Policies that Ensure Equitable Facilities Assignment

Hudson and Liberty in particular were compelled to fundraise heavily given the rental expenses of their private facilities: at Liberty, for its current facility, and at Hudson, for its anticipated second campus. New York City is a competitive charter school facilities environment, given limited public space and the high rental expenses of private buildings. Charters are forced to rent a private facility if there is no available public space in their home CSD. In light of such limited public space, a Department of Education staffer shared in an interview that her office often considers various factors in assigning new charters to public facilities. These include an assessment of whether the new charter would meet CSD needs in terms of grade levels and educational programs, as well as any evidence of the charter's prior student achievement. Because only existing charters have such student data, new independent charters are automatically at a disadvantage. Hence, a progressive and equitable charter school policy would eliminate any consideration of student achievement data, and make fully transparent available public spaces and how charters are assigned to them.

Policies that Ensure Transparent, Flexible, and Community-Determined Accountability Measures

Finally, a progressive charter school policy agenda would ensure transparency regarding how charter schools are evaluated for renewal, specifically, the extent to which charters are held accountable to their performance goals. Across each of the focal schools in this study, leaders and board trustees largely perceived successful renewal to be contingent upon students' standardized test scores; these perceptions drove them to incorporate explicit test-preparation activities. Yet between 1999 and 2016, only nine charter schools in New York State have had their charters revoked or not renewed, suggesting that performance-based accountability pressures are not as strong as charter leaders perceived.^{xciii}

Transparency regarding the extent to which test scores matter to charter schools' survival would potentially eliminate the accountability pressures that compelled charter leaders to undermine their progressive curricula. In addition, progressive charter school policies would incorporate flexible measures of student performance into the charter renewal process, ensuring that the accountability system is fully aligned with the school's pedagogical approach. As Wells argues, a flexible accountability system could also encourage diverse community stakeholders to collectively determine "the very purpose of their schooling," in turn fulfilling the communitarian and democratic aims of progressive education.^{xciv}

Recommendations for Practice: Mobilizing a Progressive Charter Policy Agenda

In order for such policies to come to fruition, progressive charter school advocates must mobilize and counter the political power of robust market-oriented charter advocacy networks

comprising foundations and other intermediary organizations.^{xcv} In this spirit, I offer the following recommendations for practice.

Build a Diverse Political Coalition for Progressive Charter Schooling

As the literature on civic capacity demonstrates, the most effective political coalitions incorporate a range of diverse stakeholders committed to a shared policy agenda.^{xcvi} Similarly, community organizing can be an effective strategy for building a diverse and equitable political coalition supporting progressive educational reforms.^{xcvii} A progressive charter school coalition would involve not only educators and families, but also other stakeholders, such as civic and religious leaders and social service professionals, committed to seeing the charter schools in their communities equitably serve all youth. An effective coalition would also commit to full community inclusion in terms of race, class, gender, and home language.^{xcviii} Given the limited political advocacy capacities of new charter schools, such as Liberty and Empire, coalitions could lend critical support to school leaders and governing boards with little time to engage directly in political advocacy. A coalition advocating for progressive charter schooling could build its capacity by partnering with groups supporting progressive education more broadly, such as the Progressive Education Network.

Relatedly, on the school level, charter leaders should encourage the political participation of its staff, as Hudson did, to further a policy agenda that supports the progressive tenets of the charter school movement. To advance progressive coalition-building, charter leaders, board trustees, and staff should also nurture their school's relationships with community stakeholders by collaborating with local arts, cultural, and religious organizations. Integrating into the community fabric in this way is in concert with the communitarian aims of progressive and democratic schooling, contrary to the self-serving goals of market-oriented education.^{xcix}

Include Teachers' Unions in Coalition-Building Efforts

Finally, a market-oriented education context is generally hostile toward teachers' unions, framing unions as barriers to effective education reform.^c For their part, unions have also long opposed charter schools, critiquing them for their lack of job security and their association with a broader educational privatization agenda.^{ci} However, a progressive charter school coalition should incorporate teachers' unions, as unions support many of the policy issues for which progressive charters also stand. These include equitable resource distribution, fair wages and benefits for teachers, and small class sizes.^{cii} Unionized charter schools such as Hudson are well-positioned to lead coalition-building across unions and progressive charters.

Toward a Progressive Education Policy Agenda

As the cases of Hudson, Liberty, and Empire illustrate, widespread market values in American politics and society and disproportionate political support for market-based education have constrained the progressive pedagogical and political potential of the charter school movement. Instead, the competitive market system encourages self-interested behaviors, compelling progressive charters to adapt their founding missions and mimic some of the ways that market-oriented charters advance their competitive edge. In turn, despite their professed commitments to advancing child-centered instruction, equitable educational opportunity, and community responsibility, this study's focal charters each contributed to already existing resource inequities across affluent and poor communities. Moreover, each school, to varying degrees, furthered a competitive market system that commoditizes public education, advantages

already privileged schools, and deepens racial and socioeconomic segregation. Only when educators, families, and advocates challenge widespread market values and mobilize around a progressive education policy agenda will the charter school movement achieve its progressive pedagogical and political goals.

Appendix: Research Design

I employed a qualitative, comparative case study design to investigate how the school leaders and board trustees at Hudson, Liberty, and Empire mobilized support for the school's progressive mission in order to survive organizationally.^{ciii} Case studies enable the investigation of phenomena that have not yet been fully conceptualized, such as the survival of progressive charters in a market context. Qualitative research is interpretivist in nature, "with the research goal of interpreting the social world from the perspectives of those who are actors in that world."^{civ} Examining independent, progressive charter schools through qualitative methods allowed me to gain a rich, in-depth understanding of each school's progressive mission, how the mission was leveraged to attract potential supporters, and how each school's approaches to mobilizing support shaped their framing of equitable, inclusive, and democratic schooling. The focal charter schools were purposively selected, based on the literature on independent, mission-oriented charter schools, which differentiates schools by founder type.^{cv}

Data Sources

Data sources included interviews, observations, and documents, collected over 10 months, from August 2017 to June 2018. I conducted semi-structured interviews with charter school leaders, board members, and their supporters (i.e., advocates, community organization staff, education reformers, elected officials).^{cvi} Further, to understand how charter school advocacy politics are situated within the broader landscape of charter school policy and advocacy in New York City and State, I interviewed policymakers and staff members in the New York City Department of Education and New York State Education Department. In total, I interviewed 44 individuals; I interviewed 11 of these individuals twice, once in fall 2017, and again in spring 2018. Those whom I interviewed twice included five school leaders and administrators (at least one per school), three board trustees (one per school), and three advocates. Interviewing these individuals twice allowed me to capture these participants' perspectives, insights, and reflections at the beginning and end of the academic year. Interviews were held in the location of each participant's choosing, typically the individual's office or a café. Interviews ranged from 30 to 100 minutes, and in total, I collected approximately 50 hours of interview data. If participants consented, I audio-recorded our interview, which was subsequently transcribed by a professional transcription service.

I supplemented interviews with observations of charter school board trustee meetings to learn about how charter school leaders discuss plans for civic mobilization, fundraising, or political advocacy. As per New York State's Open Meetings Law, these board meetings were legally required to be publicly advertised and open to public attendance.^{cvi} I observed five board meetings at each school. Each board meeting lasted approximately 90 minutes, though some lasted as long as 2 hours. In total, I observed approximately 25 hours of board trustee meetings. In addition, to gain familiarity and understanding of each school's progressive mission and key design features, I observed classrooms and select school community events, including school assemblies, tours and informational events for prospective families, and admissions lotteries. In

total, I observed approximately 16 hours of such events. Finally, I observed charter school policy and advocacy events, such as CSD town halls, charter school renewal hearings, advocacy and lobbying events, and other public meetings aimed at building support for charter schools. These included a charter school advocacy and lobbying event at the State Capitol in Albany and convenings organized by the Coalition for Community Charter Schools (C3S). In total, I observed approximately seven hours of such events. Across these three types of events, I conducted around 48 hours of observations. During observations, I conducted ethnographic field notes.^{cviii}

Finally, I collected over 200 documents, including board meeting minutes, 990 IRS tax forms, internally-produced financial reports, school marketing materials, family communications, and charter application and renewal documents as additional evidence of leaders' efforts to mobilize support.^{cix}

Data Analysis

Data were qualitatively coded in two rounds of coding using the NVivo qualitative software package, employing both inductive and deductive codes. Deductive codes were developed from key concepts from my conceptual approach on what charters do, have, and know to survive in a market context. Inductive codes were empirically grounded in the data. As I recognized patterns while coding, I wrote analytic memos to capture “emergent patterns, categories, themes, concepts, and assertions.”^{cx} I engaged in memo-writing in several ways. First, when preparing fieldnotes, I both expanded my jottings into complete narratives and wrote analytic reflections on my field experiences. Second, I read through each interview transcript at least twice and wrote memos on themes that emerged across the collection. Finally, for the duration of data collection, I wrote memos to document themes, questions, and puzzles that arose in the field.

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ⁱⁱⁱ Christopher Lubienski and Peter Weitzel, “Two Decades of Charter Schools: Shifting Expectations, Partners, and Policies,” in *The Charter School Experiment: Expectations, Evidence, and Implications*, ed. Christopher Lubienski and Peter Weitzel (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Education Press, 2010), 1–14.

^{iv} Elizabeth DeBray et al., “Intermediary Organizations in Charter School Policy Coalitions: Evidence from New Orleans,” *Educational Policy* 28, no. 2 (2014): 175–206, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0895904813514132>; Patrick McGuinn, “Fight Club: Are Advocacy Organizations Changing the Politics of Education?,” *Education Next* 12, no. 3 (2012): 25–31; Janelle Scott, “The Politics of Venture Philanthropy in Charter School Policy and Advocacy,” *Educational Policy* 23, no. 1 (2009): 106–36, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0895904808328531>; Sarah Reckhow, *Follow*

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^v Dan Cohen and Chris Lizotte, “Teaching the Market: Fostering Consent to Education Markets in the United States,” *Environment and Planning* 47, no. 9 (2015): 1824–1841, <https://doi.org/10.1068/a130273p>; Pauline Lipman, *The New Political Economy of Urban Education: Neoliberalism, Race, and the Right to the City*, The Critical Social Thought Series (New York, NY: Routledge, 2011).

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^{ix} Robert Bifulco and Helen F. Ladd, “School Choice, Racial Segregation, and Test-Score Gaps: Evidence from North Carolina’s Charter School Program,” *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management* 26, no. 1 (2007): 31–56, <https://doi.org/10.1002/pam.20226>; Janelle Scott and Adriana Villavicencio, “School Context and Charter School Achievement: A Framework for Understanding the Performance ‘Black Box,’” *Peabody Journal of Education* 84, no. 2 (2009): 227–43, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01619560902810161>.

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^{xiv} Susan F. Semel, “Introduction,” in *Schools of Tomorrow, Schools of Today: What Happened to Progressive Education*, ed. Susan F. Semel and Alan R. Sadovnik (New York, NY: Peter Lang, 1999), 1–22.

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^{xvii} Dewey, 29.

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